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The Collateral Source Rule: 
Statutory Reform and Special
Interests
David Schap and Andrew Feeley
Paul Rubin (2005) has addressed the evolution of American tort
law from a public choice perspective. In contrast to earlier work in
law and economics, which generally regarded tort law norms as effi-
cient (Landes and Posner 1987), Rubin relied on more recent work
in the field (Epstein 1988, Rubin and Bailey 1994) that regards tort
law as being shaped by the special interests of plaintiff and (perhaps
to a somewhat lesser extent) defense attorneys. In addition, Rubin
envisioned business interests’ influence toward tort reform as
enhancing efficiency. He ended his article with a call for additional
empirical research on modern American tort law from the public
choice perspective and indeed suggested a number of specific items
and areas of possible fruitful research. The spirit of Rubin’s anticipat-
ed research program, as well as many of his specific suggestions, can
be applied to our survey research findings concerning statutory
reform of the collateral source rule.
Cato Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2008). Copyright © Cato Institute. All
rights reserved.
David Schap is Professor of Economics at the College of the Holy Cross.
Andrew Feeley is an honors graduate of Holy Cross and now with the personal
lines rotation program of the Hanover Insurance Group. The authors gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the May and Stanley Smith Charitable Trust.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Public Choice Society
Meetings in New Orleans, March 29, 2006. The authors acknowledge with appre-
ciation helpful comments obtained at the conference and through the anony-
mous refereeing process. 
84
Cato Journal
The Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is a normative rule in the common law
(i.e., judge-made law) that applies to recoverable losses in tort actions
such as personal injury, wrongful death, and medical malpractice.
Specifically, the rule prohibits jury members from considering any
payments to a plaintiff (victim) other than those made by the defen-
dant tortfeasor (injurer).  Under the rule, a victim can recover full
damages from a tortfeasor even after the victim has already received
full compensation for damages from the victim’s own insurer for the
very same injurious event (assuming, of course, that the victim had
not previously by contract subrogated the rights of recovery from tort-
feasors to the insurer in consideration of a lower policy premium).
Richard Posner (2007: 199–200) regards the collateral source rule
as being an efficient common law norm. The basic argument is that
the appearance of double recovery by the victim is very much beside
the point whereas the crucial issue is that the full cost of negligent
behavior be imposed on tortfeasors if such persons or firms are to get
the correct signal concerning the appropriate (i.e., efficient) level of
care to be taken. Matters are seemingly a bit trickier, for example, in
a case of workplace-induced injury where the injured party’s employ-
er has provided the insurance policy under which recovery has been
obtained. Some states specifically exclude double recovery in such a
situation. Posner deftly sees through this complication, noting that
insurance is part of a compensation package, so that in the absence
of employer-provided insurance the worker would have negotiated a
higher wage. Thus, the insurance, although employer-provided in
appearance, is actually paid for by the employee in the form of a
lower wage rate than would otherwise be the case. In Posner’s view,
therefore, exceptions to the ordinary collateral source rule in the cir-
cumstance of employer-provided insurance actually decrease effi-
ciency. Posner concedes that exceptions to the rule for certain
public-sector benefits, like monies awarded through workers’ com-
pensation programs, suitably establish a governmental right to recov-
ery of public funds without adversely affecting efficiency.
Posner’s analysis may appear to be open to criticism. For one
thing, as noted elsewhere in Posner (2007: 172), but not in his dis-
cussion of the collateral source rule, potential victims frequently have
a role to play in accident avoidance and must be given correct signals
of what constitutes appropriate precautionary behavior. If there were
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to be double recovery under the collateral source rule, then victims
might actually induce accidents, the cost of which would then be only
half of what a victim could expect to recover from two sources
(namely, the tortfeasor and an insurer).
There are three fallacies embedded within this attempt at criti-
cism. First, and most obvious, the logic of the criticism fails if poten-
tial victims have already voluntarily (i.e., by contract) provided for
subrogation of their rights to recovery to the insurance provider, for
then there is only a single recovery by any victim. Second, depend-
ing on which variant of negligence law one has in mind, victim recov-
ery may indeed be blocked or reduced in situations in which the
victim is willfully, principally, or even just partially at fault. Third,
concerning situations in which victims allegedly might take inade-
quate levels of care, insurance premiums would presumably reflect
such possibilities. The moral hazard problem (wherein those insured
are induced to behave more recklessly at the margin by virtue of
their being insured) may be so severe as to preclude insurance in cer-
tain markets. Where insurance is in fact provided, given the insurer
must charge a premium sufficient to cover overhead costs, if direct
primary recovery from the tortfeasor by the victim is assured then
the purchase of insurance represents an actuarially unfair and need-
less (i.e., avoidable) bet. Consequently, one should not expect victims
to purchase insurance for the sake of merely gambling in hopes of a
second recovery, at least not if they are risk-neutral or risk-averse
individuals. To our knowledge this point has not been previously
noted in the literature. 
A second type of criticism has been applied to Posnerian logic
with respect to the collateral source rule. The criticism grants that
the collateral source rule may be efficient, but calls for exceptions to
be created to the rule because other sources of inefficiency in tort
law result in a general overcompensation of victims, and it may not
be possible to alter the other sources of inefficiency (U.S.
Congressional Budget Office 2004: 6). By way of example, the rea-
soning at hand might call attention to the phenomenon of runaway
jury awards in a context in which the legislature for some reason has
been unwilling or unable to cap damages in tort actions. In such a sit-
uation, with logical validity (yet with a measure of uneasiness) one
might call for exceptions to the collateral source rule as a “second
best” tort reform solution. The application of “second best” argu-
mentation is vexing to the extent that it may leave one not knowing
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whether any rule or norm could ever be considered truly efficient on
its own merits, because the efficiency properties of a rule would no
longer be determined in an otherwise isolated state. Rather, they
would always be contextually determined and dependent on the exis-
tence and performance of other rules.
Determining whether the collateral source rule is itself efficient
(assuming “second best” argumentation does not preclude such a
determination) is not really the primary purpose of the analysis here.
Suffice it to say that the rule has undergone substantial revision in
many (but not all) state legislatures, and empirical studies have
emerged that attempt to measure the efficiency consequences of mod-
ification of the rule in the states. Weakened versions of the collateral
source rule are reported to be associated with (1) increased vehicular
accidental deaths, as drivers exhibit marginally less care when they face
less than the full costs of the accidents they cause (Rubin and
Shepherd 2005), and (2) increased infant mortality (concentrated in
the black population), as physicians exercise less care when accounta-
bility for full malpractice costs is reduced (Klick and Stratmann 2005). 
Rather than exploring the efficiency consequences of statutory
modifications of the collateral source rule, we focus attention on doc-
umenting and explaining the statutory modifications. We present the
detailed results of our survey of statutory laws governing application of
the collateral source rule in the states. Amendment of the rule by
statute in the states provides a natural setting to apply public choice
analysis of tort reform along the lines envisioned by Rubin (2005). The
types of statutory revisions of the common law collateral source rule
that have occurred lend themselves to categorization as to whether the
revision erodes the rule or represents a partial return to the original
rule. The statutory exceptions to the rule, and exceptions to the excep-
tions, can then be thought of as “ smoking guns” in that they often can
be traced back to the hands of underlying special interests.
In the case of the collateral source rule, reform does not appear to
us to follow conveniently a secondary thesis implied in Rubin
(2005)—namely, that tort reform is a movement (driven by business
interests and sometimes those of medical care providers) away from
lawyer-friendly special interest rules and norms toward a more effi-
cient institutional state. We offer as an alternative theory that tort
reform in the particular case of modification of the collateral source
rule is driven by the relative political clout of various special interests
in different times and places—despite the drift from efficiency such
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modifications may cause. From the alternative viewpoint, efficiency
considerations are of secondary importance in understanding,
explaining, or predicting so-called tort reform in the case of the col-
lateral source rule.
Our purpose here is modest. We provide a public choice analysis
that links various statutory modifications of the rule’s application to
underlying special interests that benefit from such modification. Our
analysis also takes note of those special interests that benefit from
retention of the original rule, or at least partial return to the original
given some prior modification of it. We believe our analysis plants
the seeds for future empirical testing of the extent to which special
interests have actually induced or inhibited statutory modification of
the collateral source rule. 
We begin our analysis by presenting the most relevant portion of
the results of our survey of statutory reform of the collateral source
rule. We then describe the special interest influences at play and
connect the interest groups to the statutory exceptions (and excep-
tions to the exceptions) in a way that suggests the foundations of a
research design applicable to subsequent empirical testing. Lastly we
review several of the specific suggestions contained in Rubin (2005)
to demonstrate that our survey results do indeed provide a promis-
ing basis for full-blown empirical testing of special interest influence
on the collateral source rule. We conclude, in agreement with Rubin
(2005), that American tort law appears to have been influenced by
special interests, but we dispute the notion that tort reform (at least
as it concerns modification of the original collateral source rule) has
been a progression toward greater efficiency. 
Statutory Modifications of the Collateral Source Rule 
We examine the statutes of all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands (henceforth, referred to as “ the
jurisdictions”) to identify the myriad forms that reform of the collat-
eral source rule has taken. We queried the annotated state codes in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe for the following terms: collateral
source, collateral benefit, collateral payment, collateral source rule,
collateral source benefit, third-party payment, tort, civil action,
admissible, admissibility, gratuitous, subrogation, insurance, lien,
worker’s compensation, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. To
ensure we had the most recent legislation, the statutes and their
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respective titles, chapters, and sections were obtained from the gov-
ernment and legislative websites of each jurisdiction. After thorough-
ly reviewing these statutes, we categorized the many types of reform
to bring cohesion to the sizeable amount of information gathered. A
side benefit was that upon completion of the categorization process
the entire body of information could be presented in tabular form.
It is appropriate at this juncture to compare our compiled results
to Avraham’s (2006) impressive database on reform of state tort law.
Avraham presents tort law reforms of all types, including those con-
cerning the collateral source rule, by state. He provides a brief sum-
mary description of each reform and gives information on the
effective date of the reform, whether a jury is permitted to know of
the reform, and whether the reform has been deemed constitution-
al in the courts. In contrast, our compiled results concern only the
collateral source rule, not all state-level reforms, and should not be
thought of as a subset of Avraham’s database. Our results apply to a
particular point in time and include two territories (Puerto Rico and
Virgin Islands) that do not appear in Avraham’s database. Most
important, our results organize the prevalent forms of collateral source
rule statutory reform across the states into two dozen categories within a
half-dozen major types (whereas Avraham presents no such summary
classifications). In this article, we describe the categories and give
summary statistics on the number of instances of each category
across the many jurisdictions.1
Our organizing principle was to create a distinct category whenev-
er a type of reform was observed in at least two jurisdictions, but not
otherwise. Table 1 demonstrates that: (1) there is rich variation in
jurisdictional statutes addressing the collateral source rule; (2) some
modifications of the rule can be classified without error as benefiting
certain special interest groups; and (3) the connection between mod-
ifications of the rule and underlying special interests, once coupled
with a priori measures of the political influence of interest groups in
the various jurisdictions, forms a promising foundation for empirical
testing of the kind anticipated by Rubin (2005).2
1The data may also be presented in disaggregated fashion while still retaining the
classifications (see Feeley and Schap 2006), so that each jurisdiction’s statutory sta-
tus is presented per our coding.
2In an unabridged version of Table 1, available from the authors, we provide
instances of reforms observed in single jurisdictions and document modifications
that appear to be purely procedural. We also provide instances of exceptions to the
collateral source rule with respect to crime victim compensation.
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Among the reforms of the collateral source rule are certain mod-
ifications of exceptions to the rule. We have classified the reforms as
either exceptions to (i.e., erosions of) the original rule or as excep-
tions to the exceptions (i.e., partial returns to the original rule). The
exceptions are identified in Table 1 by way of an intuitive use of
minus (-) for erosions of the original rule and plus (+) for partial
returns to the original rule. The final column in Table 1 details the
number of instances of each particular modification in the various
jurisdictions.3
Special Interest Influence on the Collateral Source Rule
Determining how various special interests benefit from the collat-
eral source rule or modification of it is a rather straightforward exer-
cise in public choice. The original rule (without modification)
happens to benefit attorneys because it makes the size of tort awards
larger than in the absence of the rule. We write “happens to benefit”
to adhere to our claim that the rule itself may exist primarily for a rea-
son other than to benefit attorneys, namely for efficiency’s sake.
Nevertheless, it is true that both plaintiff and defense attorneys do
benefit when the unmodified rule is in place and tort awards are
potentially large: plaintiff attorneys because  they often receive a per-
centage of the award; defense attorneys because they are likely to
have a more substantial number of billable hours when the stakes
involved in the outcome of a case are higher (see Epstein 1988:
313–14, Rubin 2005: 229).
Consider next the interests of insurance companies. Insurers of
defendants benefit from modifications of the collateral source rule
that preclude recovery under certain circumstances because such
modifications reduce the size of awards. Interestingly, the gain is
transitory, not ongoing. Insurers will have a one-time gain on all exist-
ing policies written in the past with premiums that reflected inher-
ent risk before the change in the law was enacted, because the payoff
on those policies will, with the law’s modification, be less than what
was actuarially predicted. Over time, however, if purchasers of insur-
ance are well informed and savvy, they will recognize the insurance
is less valuable than previously thought, and the premiums charged
by insurers will be adjusted downward in response to market forces.
3In our unabridged table, we indicate the specific modifications for each jurisdiction.
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Sometimes the interests of competing insurers are pitted directly
against one another. McCabe (2005: 3–4) cites an interesting situa-
tion that arose in California with the enactment of an exception to
the collateral source rule in cases of medical malpractice. The statute
eliminated subrogation as a right of insurers in such cases, which had
the consequence of shifting a portion of the cost of medical mal-
practice away from the state’s medical malpractice insurers to its
health and disability insurers. 
Members of the general business community, to the extent they
purchase insurance that serves as protection in cases of tort lawsuits
brought against them, benefit from erosions to the collateral source
rule. If insured, these people and firms will experience the ongoing
reduced insurance premiums described earlier. If uninsured, they
gain because the expected awards made in tort lawsuits brought
against them would be lower than under the unmodified original col-
lateral source rule. 
Matters are a bit different for medical care providers. Like mem-
bers of the general business community, whether insured or not
medical care providers benefit from erosions to the rule that lessen
the size of tort awards. Beyond that, medical care providers can ben-
efit as a narrow interest group from exceptions to the collateral
source rule that are specific to their industry alone. 
The coding in Table 1, introduced initially to show exceptions (and
exceptions to exceptions) to the collateral source rule, can now be
called upon to serve the dual purpose of indicating the special-inter-
est benefits of modifications to the rule. Ignoring for the time being
the section that concerns public-sector collateral sources, the items
(i.e., modifications) marked by minus (-) signs work against attorneys
as a class to the benefit of the business community, particularly insur-
ers, while the other items (i.e., modifications of modifications)
marked with a plus (+) sign have exactly the opposite special-interest
effects. In addition, note that the exceptions listed with specific ref-
erence to cases of medical malpractice also work pointedly to the
benefit of medical care providers. 
In the case of public-sector collateral sources, erosions of the rule
(marked by minus signs) harm attorneys but do not create gains to
the business community or its insurers. Such exceptions do not
lessen the size of awards paid by tortfeasors; they merely serve to
allocate a portion of a given award to repay public funds that provide
temporary relief to an injured party. The erosions harm plaintiff
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attorneys to the extent that their percentage share of award proceeds
applies only to the portion of the award recovered by the victim and
not the portion returned to the public-sector. The erosions do work
to the benefit of taxpayers generally. According to public choice
analysis, however, taxpayers are prototypically an exploited class
because taxpayers are too numerous to form an effective narrow spe-
cial interest group (Olson 1965). Still, there are certainly an abundant
number of actual cases in which select taxpayer interests have been
represented by lobbying groups, such as when tax-limitation meas-
ures have acquired the requisite number of signatures to become
referenda. The jurisdictional variation concerning public-sector col-
lateral source modifications presents fertile ground for measuring
the linkage between the degree of taxpayer coalescence and its effect
on collateral source rule modification. There may also be transitory
benefits to private insurance companies arising from public-sector
exceptions to the extent that there are policies insuring public-sector
fund payouts (if governments do not routinely self-insure). 
In the case of collateral source rule modifications outside the pub-
lic sector, there remains the task of empirically linking (a) the modi-
fications and the interests of the groups specified to (b) the relative
political power wielded by those groups in the various jurisdictions.
A priori empirical measures of influence would need to be developed
based on the relative size or relative income of the interest group
within each given jurisdiction. It seems to us that an index of politi-
cal influence of these interest groups could be constructed, or a
series of influence-measuring variables could be defined, and used to
test the power of the special interest hypothesis in explaining the
actual incidence of statutory exceptions to the collateral source rule
(and exceptions to the exceptions).
It may appear odd that our list of relevant interest groups fails to
include the victims themselves. The omission of victims is not acci-
dental. Victims do not constitute a viable interest group from a pub-
lic choice perspective. Victims are very much unlike the doctors,
lawyers, and insurers who have relatively small memberships in
comparison to the numerous unorganized individuals that they
politically exploit. Moreover, they have many reasons going beyond
the collateral source rule to sustain the cost of interest-group forma-
tion, and they can identify one another at low cost for the purpose
of interest-group formation (see Olson 1965). In contrast, potential
victims are too numerous to viably exploit another faction. From an
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ex ante perspective, those who ultimately become actual victims
would confront an event with low probability of occurrence (i.e., an
accident) and substantial costs of organizing (e.g., identifying those
who will subsequently suffer an accident), so they would as individ-
uals predictably be rationally ignorant concerning the legal content
of the collateral source rule and would not have become part of a
pre-existing interest group prior to accident. Ex post, actual victims
have no ongoing reason for interest group participation once their
cases are settled or they win (or lose) their pleadings in court. Given
the transitory nature of their interests and the organizing costs they
face, actual victims are unlikely to transcend the coalescence prob-
lem in any substantial way. 
If we are correct that the original collateral source rule promotes
efficiency, then the courts must have been acting according to
Posnerian logic. But why should judges pursue efficiency? Perhaps
because they are civic-minded individuals to begin with and (unlike
legislators) are insulated from the contaminating influence of special
interests by virtue of lifetime appointments to office. But not all
judges are granted lifetime appointments; some are elected and still
others are appointed initially and after a period of time must stand
for election. Nevertheless, the duration of the election cycle for
judges is much longer than that of legislators, which suggests that
judges appointed for life are least influenced by special interests, fol-
lowed by other judges, followed by legislators who are most influ-
enced by special interests. Accordingly, one should expect less
statutory modification of the collateral source rule in jurisdictions
where judges must stand for election—because the special interests
attempting to obtain modification may have already succeeded in
obtaining it directly through favorable court rulings by sympathetic
jurists. Of course, a better test of this hypothesis would be to see if
the courts themselves had indeed modified the collateral source rule
in those jurisdictions in which judges stand for election. That informa-
tion is not readily available at this time since our survey covers only
statutory law, not case law.
Rubin’s Recommendations 
Rubin (2005) presents eight questions and issues that need to be
addressed in empirical research on American tort law from a public
choice perspective. Six of the eight are especially relevant to our dis-
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cussion. We reformulate them to assist us in referencing directly and
most clearly how our own work responds to Rubin’s call for addition-
al research. 
First, how do the relevant interest groups overcome the Olsonian
(Olson 1965) problem of coalescence and transcend the free-rider
problem? Response: Lobbying groups representing lawyers
(Association of Trial Lawyers of America, now renamed American
Association for Justice), doctors (American Medical Association), and
insurers (National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies) exist-
ed before reform of the collateral source rule was contemplated. The
American Tort Reform Association, which came into being in 1986,
was the creation of two previously existing lobbying organizations: the
AMA and the American Council of Engineering Companies.4
Second, the role of doctors in tort reform has been insufficiently
studied. Response: We suggest a possible direct link between the
political influence of medical care providers and the exceptions to
the collateral source rule in cases of medical malpractice.
Third, it should be possible to study the effects of campaign con-
tributions and campaign spending in jurisdictions in which judges
must stand for election. Response: Our analysis brings to promi-
nence the distinction among appointed judges versus elected judges
versus elected legislators in a very pointed way.
Fourth, some states have enacted reform measures and their
determinants are worthy of study. Response: Our study does precise-
ly this in a foundational way, but formal empirical testing remains to
be done.
Fifth, how do special interests decide which mechanism (the courts
or the legislature) to use to gain special favor? Response: The distinc-
tions we made earlier concerning appointed judges versus elected
judges versus elected legislators appear especially relevant here. 
Sixth, many, but not all legislators are attorneys, raising obvious
questions about financial conflict of interest or loyalty to a profession;
such questions are worthy of study. Response: We could easily have
added in the research design the description of a variable measuring
the percentage of legislators in each jurisdiction with law degrees. We
would predict the larger the percentage, the less modification of the
collateral source rule.
4For more on this point, see Feeley and Schap (2006: 4–6). Note also the discussion
in the previous section concerning taxpayers and (in contrast) the discussion of acci-
dent victims.
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The remaining two observations made by Rubin in his call for
additional research have to do with the relationship of special inter-
est groups to national political parties and to tort reform bills in the
U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. These observations are
not especially relevant to a study aimed principally at state-level
reforms.
Conclusion 
Our perspective and Rubin’s both share the notion that special
interests have shaped modern American tort law and that those
interests can be measured empirically, as can the influence of those
interests on legislated outcomes. Thus, it is possible through the lens
of public choice to conduct an analysis of the influence of various
interest groups on the evolution and reform of modern American
tort law. 
We differ with Rubin on the relevant starting point for the analy-
sis. To us it appears that judges who are public-spirited and who pos-
sess lifetime appointments might indeed discover and implement
rules that promote the general welfare by virtue of the impact of the
rules on promoting joint-wealth maximization of the parties involved
in the disputes. This perspective, of course, is most readily identified
with the work of Richard Posner (2007). Our starting point would be
to grant that certain common law norms, in fact, are efficient. We
count among those norms the collateral source rule and, thus, are
rather dismissive of the “second best” argument presented earlier.
Rubin (2005: 223) would appear to insist that “no plausible mecha-
nism, Darwinian or otherwise, exists [in common law] for generating
that desirable property [of efficiency].” Instead, he apparently would
have us take as a reference point the U.S. common law of tort, con-
ceived of as a body of rules concocted to benefit the legal profession,
and subsequently ameliorated by competing interest groups who
have promoted legislation that improves efficiency. 
We do not deny that lawyers have influenced U.S. tort law. Rubin
(2005: 234) cites as examples the erosion of the doctrine of privity
and the spread of the doctrine of comparative negligence. Our analy-
sis of the collateral source rule, however, casts doubt upon it being a
good example of a judicial norm that exists for the sole purpose of lin-
ing the pockets of attorneys. Statutory reform of the collateral source
rule, however, fashioned as it was by legislators facing short election
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cycles and beholden to special interests, does indeed appear to
reflect the playing out of competing special interests and presents an
excellent opportunity for empirical testing along the lines generally
suggested by Rubin and in this article. 
Thus, although we may quibble with Rubin on certain details, we
readily concur with his call for additional empirical research on
American tort law and its reform. We hope we have provided a solid
foundation and motivation for further empirical research on tort law
from a public choice perspective, especially concerning the collater-
al source rule. 
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